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EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT, 
Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
vs. 
GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN 
DOE WILSON, individually and 
dba WILSON CALDER, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Is the claim of Appellees, based upon a theory of 
negligence, barred by reason of the four-year statute of 
limitations since Appellees discovered, or should have discovered, 
that a problem existed at the time of their receipt of deeds in 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 930120 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 
Priority No. 15 
1 
1980? Did the trial court error in not finding that the action was 
time barred in the face of Appellees' testimony that they were 
aware of the discrepancies between the deeds and the uniform real 
estate contracts but decided not to investigate the problem? The 
standard of review is one of correctness giving no deference to the 
trial court's conclusion of law. 
b. Did the trial court use an improper measure of 
damages in calculating the amount to award to Appellees? Was there 
a proper causal connection between the negligence of Appellant and 
the damages claimed by Appellees? The standard of review is one of 
correctness giving no deference to the trial court's conclusion of 
law. 
c. Did the trial court improperly exclude from evidence the 
business diary kept by John Stafford, one of the surveyors, who had 
died a few months before trial? The standard of review is one of 
correctness giving no deference to the trial courtf s conclusion of 
law. 
d. Did the trial court properly conclude that pre-judgment 
interest should run from the date of the reconveyance? The 
standard of review is one of correctness giving no deference to the 
trial court's conclusion of law. 
e. Did the trial court properly assess costs in the case 
including the filing fees of the prior appeal, the witness fees in 
the first trial in which Appellant was not a party, the witness 
fees for experts of Appellant, the transcript of the first trial, 
printing costs of the briefs in the first appeal, photocopies, etc? 
2 
The standard of review is one of correctness giving no deference to 
the trial court's conclusion of law, 
f. Did the trial court properly deny the objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law doing so without even a 
hearing on the objections particularly when the trial court had 
issued only a very brief conclusory minute entry, without any 
findings of fact, on its decision of the case? The standard of 
review is presently believed to be whether the trial court abused 
its discretion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This dispute revolves around a parcel of property located in 
the Strawberry River Estates in the Uinta Basin. This parcel was 
purchased by the Appellees in June, 1971, by means of a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. This contract contained a legal description 
of the property which differed by 1000 feet from that which the 
Strawberry River Estates had represented to the Appellees as being 
lots 30 and 31. In early 1972, Glen H. Calder, Appellant, signed 
a survey certificate which contained the same legal description as 
provided in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
In October of 1980, Appellees received a Warranty Deed 
transferring title to the Appellees. The legal description in that 
deed differed from that in the Uniform Real Estate Contract by 10 
feet. The Appellees recognized the error, but did not investigate 
as to why the legal description had changed. After the value of 
3 
the property significantly increased during the national oil 
crisis, the Appellees sold by contract the property with the legal 
description contained in the October, 1980, Warranty Deed, but 
represented to the purchasers that they owned the property which 
they intended to purchase, that being lots 30 and 31. 
Upon the purchasers' discovery of the discrepancy, they filed 
suit to rescind the contract. Appellees filed a third-party action 
against Calder based on negligence with respect to his signing of 
the survey certificate. Calder moved for summary judgment and was 
dismissed from the action. The trial court ruled in favor of the 
purchaser rescinding the contract. The Appellees appealed the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment, which the Utah Supreme 
Court overturned and remanded for trial with respect to the third-
party action. 
The third-party action claimed that Calder was negligent in 
signing a certificate which did not reflect that which Appellees 
believed to have purchased. Appellees claimed that Calder was 
therefore liable for all damages sustained by Appellees including 
the losses associated with the rescinded sale. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Trial Court 
After being remanded from the Utah Supreme Court, the case was 
heard on June 23, 1992, in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
Those who testified on behalf of the Third-Party Plaintiffs 
were Eugene E. Kightly and Harry D. Kreis, Third-Party Plaintiffs; 
4 
Bing Christensen, a certified surveyor; and Gerald Wilkerson, a 
real estate agent. 
Those who testified on behalf of the Third-Party Defendants 
were Glen Calder, Third-Party Defendant and Floyd Ostler, survey 
crew member. Also, the testimony of Merrill Gunderson, another 
survey crew member, was proffered by Robert F. Babcock, attorney 
for Calder, as being cumulative and supportive of the testimony of 
Floyd Ostler. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court continued the case 
pending the hearing of closing arguments. The closing arguments 
were argued on October 28, 1992. The court issued its decision in 
this case by Minute Entry dated November 19, 1992, in favor of the 
Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs prepared and filed with the court 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law along with a Judgment in 
conjunction with this case. The court signed on December 23, 1992, 
the Judgment and the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. 
Calder prepared and filed an objection to the proposed findings and 
requested a hearing regarding the proposal. The court summarily 
denied Calder's objections and also denied the request for hearing. 
Glen H. Calder, filed a Notice of Appeal in the Third District 
Court on March 2, 1993. On or about April 13, 1993, Calder filed 
its Docketing Statement with this Court. 
C. Designation of the Parties 
Eugene E. Kightly, Helen L. Kightly, Harry D. Kreis, and Peggy 
R. Kreis Barnett, Third-Party Plaintiffs in the trial and Appellees 
5 
here, and hereafter throughout this brief, will be referred to 
collectively as Appellees. 
Glen H. Calder, Third-Party Defendant in the trial and 
Appellant here, and hereafter throughout this brief, will be 
referred to as Calder. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
a. In June 1971, Appellees entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract as buyers with Strawberry River Estates as seller 
for certain property.1 
b. Appellees were shown the property by the representatives 
of the seller while being shown a plat map prepared by Ed Allen 
having the property divided into lots. It was Appellees' intent to 
purchase lots 30 and 31.2 
c. Calder had no involvement preceding the purchase of the 
property by Appellees. Appellees purchased the property prior to 
any surveying work being done.3 
d. When the property was purchased by Appellees the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract did not refer to the lot numbers on the plat 
map that had been shown to Appellees. Rather, the Contract spoke 
in terms of a metes and bounds description.4 
1
 Ex. P-6. 
2
 Exs. P-4, P-5, P-6; Kightly R. 373, 420; Kreis R. 467, 
471 - 472. 
3
 Kightly R. 411 - 412; Kreis R. 475 - 476; Calder R. 517. 
4
 Exs. P-5 and P-6. Kightly R. 406; Kreis R. 468 - 469. 
6 
e. Apparently, whether through intent or inadvertence on the 
part of the seller Strawberry River Estates, there was a 
discrepancy between the metes and bounds description used in the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract and the dimensions shown on the plat 
map for lots 30 and 31. One of the dimensions that should have 
read 1320 feet actually was typed to read 320 feet. Obviously 
leaving the 1 off of the figure of 1320 created a 1000 foot 
discrepancy.5 
f. Approximately ten months later Strawberry River Estates 
contacted John Stafford and two others working with him requesting 
that they perform certain survey work including surveying the 
corners of lots 30 and 31. Strawberry River Estates hired and paid 
Stafford and his associates for the work performed.6 
g. Appellees did not hire nor pay Calder for placing the 
stakes in the corners of lots 30 and 31. This information was 
contained in Stafford's diary which was excluded by the trial 
court.7 
h. Appellees testified they hired Calder to survey according 
to the metes and bounds description from the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Appellees testified that they did not give the surveyors 
a plat map. Appellees testified that they contacted the surveyors 
5
 Compare Exs. P-3, P-5, and P-6. Kightly R. 377; Kreis R. 
475; Calder R. 515 - 516. 
6
 Stafford Diary. Ostler R. 528 - 533, 539, 541 - 542. 
7
 Stafford Diary. 
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in their Duchesne office, next to the office of their attorney-
David Sam, in the Spring of 1972.8 
i. Calder and Ostler testified that there was no office in 
Duchesne at this time. Each of the surveyors were doing business 
out of their own homes.9 Ostler testified that he did not perform 
any survey in the Strawberry River Estates using a metes and bounds 
description, but only staked property corners off of a plat map.10 
j. Both the surveyors and the Appellees testified that the 
survey was performed on a Saturday.11 Appellees agree that the 
property was staked as to the corners of the plat map.12 
k. Calder had no involvement in the initial survey work 
performed by Stafford or his associates. Calder had been a 
surveying instructor for Stafford and his associates at the civil 
engineering department at Brigham Young University. During this 
time (1972) Stafford and his associates were working toward being 
licensed professional surveyors. When there was something that 
needed to be signed by a licensed professional surveyor, Stafford 
8
 Kightly R. 377 - 378, 407, 416 - 417, 421 - 422. Kreis R. 
469. 
9
 Calder R. 494; Ostler R. 533, 537. 
10
 Ostler R. 529 - 532. 
11
 Kightly R. 378 - 380. Kreis R. 458 - 459. Ostler R. 528 -
529. 
12
 Klinger R. 409. 
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and his associates would perform the work and request that Calder 
review the work and sign the document for ten percent of the fee.13 
1. Some time after the initial survey work was performed at 
the request of Strawberry River Estates to establish the corners of 
lots 30 and 31, Appellees approached the surveyors requesting that 
a map be prepared.14 Mr. Kightly testified that he received the 
certificate of survey in October of 1972.15 
m. The detail in the certificate prepared by Stafford and 
his associates properly showed the location of the property in 
relation to the section lines. Appellees apparently did not 
carefully review the plat map signed by Calder which was prepared 
by Stafford and his associates. The detail on that plat was 
inconsistent with what was shown on the initial plat map of Ed 
Allen which served as the representation and basis for the purchase 
by Appellees.16 
n. In 1980, Appellees received the warranty deed along with 
two quit claim deeds each containing a different legal description 
than was in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The description of 
320 was changed to 330 which is exactly one-fourth of a section. 
At this time, someone had apparently concluded that some type of 
13
 Calder R. 487, 493, 503, and 517. Ostler R. 536 - 537, 
540. 
14
 Kightly R. 415. 
15
 R. 424. 
16
 Ex. P-l. Kightly R. 409 - 410. Calder R. 495 - 498. 
9 
error had been made and adjusted the legal description to 
compensate for the "error."17 
o. In 1980, the Appellees also received a special warranty 
deed also referring to the changed legal description of 330 feet.18 
p. In 1980, Mr. Rightly was, in fact, aware of the error in 
the legal description between the Uniform Real Estate Contract and 
the subsequent deeds but made no effort to investigate the reason 
for the error.19 
q. Appellees discovered through the receipt of the two quit 
claim deeds and the subsequent special warranty deed that the legal 
description was different than what was shown in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and in the plat signed by Calder. A reasonable 
inquiry into the discrepancy between the legal descriptions would 
have led to the discovery of the conflict between the description 
of lots 30 and 31 and the metes and bounds description, but the 
Appellees did nothing.20 
r. In the ensuing years, Appellees continued to use the 
property as represented to them by the seller as lots 30 and 31, 
which was staked by Stafford and his associates, when in reality 
what had been sold to them under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
Ex. D-l and D-2. Rightly R. 413 - 414, 427. 
Compare P-6 and P-8. 
Compare P-6 and P-8. Rightly R. 412 - 413, 427 - 428. 







was actually 1000 feet to the east and what had been deeded to them 
in 1980 was 990 feet to the east.21 
s. Twelve years after Appellees purchased the property and 
eleven years after the survey work was performed for Strawberry 
River Estates and the plat drawn for Appellees, and after the value 
of the property in that area substantially increased, Appellees 
decided to sell the "property." Appellees represented to the 
ultimate purchaser in 1983 that the "property" was where the 
sellers had represented it to be and where the stakes were set, 
both of which were based upon the unrecorded plat showing lots 30 
and 31.22 
t. Appellees claim to have shown Klingers, the ultimate 
purchaser, the plat signed by Calder.23 The Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between Appellees and Klingers, however, did not use the 
description from Calder's map. Instead, the contract used the 
"corrected" legal description that appeared in the deeds to 
Appellees in 1980.24 
u. Appellees have alleged on several occasions during the 
litigation that Calder used the wrong reference point in performing 
the survey. Kreis testified that Appellees collectively concluded 
21
 Exs. P-5, P-6, and P-8. Rightly R. 377; Kreis R. 475; 
Calder R. 515 - 516. 
22
 Ex. P-7. Klinger R. 388 - 390. Wilkerson R. 436. Kreis 
R. 461 - 462. 
23
 Kightly R. 389. Wilkerson R. 437. Kreis R. 461. 
24
 Compare P-l, P-6, P-7, and P-8. Kightly R. 390 
11 
that the surveyors incorrectly used the quarter marker rather than 
finding the northeast corner of Section ll.25 
v. The Klingers brought an action to rescind the sale. 
Recision was granted because Appellees did not own the property 
that they verbally represented to Klingers that was to be the 
subject of the sale. Appellees have, therefore, reacquired the 
property from Klingers and still own the same property.26 
w. Appellees claimed against Calder the loss of bargain of 
a sale of property that Appellees never owned. Appellees actually 
purchased the property identified by the metes and bounds 
description and sold according to a "corrected" legal description. 
The verbal representations, however, were that Appellees were 
selling property in the river bottoms that Appellees had intended 
upon purchasing themselves, but in reality did not purchase. 
Appellees were most interested in the western property in the river 
bottoms because it was most useable.27 
x. The property is worth basically the same at the time of 
trial as it was at the time it was purchased by Appellees. There 
was, however, a spike in the real estate prices in the Uinta Basin 
area at the time of the oil boom. It was at that time that 
Appellees sold the property to Klingers. The artificial spike was 
25
 Kreis R. 463, 478. 
26
 R. 2. Kightly R. 392 - 395. 
27
 Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8. Kightly R. 373, 420. Kreis R. 
467, 471 - 472. Wilkerson R. 445. 
12 
not reasonably foreseeable as a result of the claimed negligence of 
Calder.28 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellees claim that Calder was negligent in signing a survey 
certificate that contained a legal description which differed from 
what the Appellees believed they were purchasing from Strawberry 
River Estates. In 1980, Appellees knew of an error in the legal 
description of their property, but failed to investigate. The four 
year statute of limitations as it relates to negligence began to 
run at that time. Appellees did not bring this action within the 
four year limitation, and therefore, this claim is time barred as 
a matter of law. 
Appellees' claim of negligence on the part of Calder, if any, 
is not causally connected to the damages claimed. Furthermore, the 
damages alleged were not foreseeable due to the fact that the value 
of the real estate dramatically fluctuated. The trial court also 
awarded damages which were not supported by the evidence. The 
damages awarded were inappropriate, contrary to the evidence 
presented at trial, and without basis as related to any negligence 
on the part of Calder. 
The trial court denied the admittance of John Stafford's 
survey diary, a member to the survey crew. Evidence was presented 
from the other members of the survey crew which provided adequate 
foundation to authenticate Stafford's diary as the one used by 
Stafford during the performance of the survey. This diary was kept 
28
 Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8. Wilkerson R. 445. 
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in the normal course of the survey group's business. The trial 
court's denial to admit the diary was erroneous. 
The trial court awarded Appellees pre-judgment interest as 
part of its decision. The basis of liability was found to be in 
negligence, not contract. The trial court awarded damages which 
were not calculated with mathematical certainty, which is required 
when awarding prejudgment interest. As such, the court's awarding 
of pre-judgment interest was clearly erroneous. 
The trial court also awarded costs to the Appellees. However, 
included in those costs were expenses which were not related to 
this case, contrary to the evidence and minute entry ruling by the 
trial court, and/or not allowed to be taxed as costs by statute and 
case law. The trial court's award for these costs is without basis 
in the law and clearly erroneous. 
The trial court further mechanically adopted Appellees' 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This was done 
despite the fact that Calder filed objections to said findings and 
requested a hearing before the trial court for argument. 
Furthermore, Appellees filed a Reply to Calder's objections 
agreeing to modify some of the findings. However, the trial court 





THE CLAIM OF APPELLEES, BASED UPON A THEORY OF 
NEGLIGENCE, IS BARRED BY REASON OF THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS SINCE APPELLEES DISCOVERED, OR SHOULD HAVE 
DISCOVERED, THAT A PROBLEM IN THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THEIR RECEIPT OF DEEDS IN 1980. 
In this case, the trial court found that Glen H. Calder, a 
licensed surveyor, was negligent in the certification of a survey 
of Appellees' property, and Appellees sustained damage as a result 
of the negligence.29 In so doing, the trial court errored in not 
ruling that the action based on negligence was time barred due to 
the fact that the Appellees knew, or should have known, of the 
error in 1980, at the latest, thus actuating the four year statute 
of limitations. 
In a case claiming damage under the negligence theory/ the 
action must be commenced within four (4) years as provided in Utah 
Code Annotated §78-12-25(2). With respect to the statute of 
limitations and the applicability of the "discovery rule", the 
Supreme Court, in a previous appeal from this same case, held that 
the discovery rule was applicable and, therefore, the statute of 
limitations would begin to run when the party "learns of or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts 
which give rise to the cause of action." Klinqer v. Kiqhtly. 791 
P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). With this ruling and instruction, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court. 
29
 Conclusions Nos. 1 and 2. Minute Entry R. 291. 
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At trial, much evidence was introduced indicating that the 
Appellees knew or should have known of the legal description error 
surrounding the property purchased in the Strawberry River Estates* 
When the Appellees first discussed the potential purchase of 
property in the Strawberry River Estates, the agents showed the 
Appellees a plat map and together walked the property site.30 
Subsequently, the Appellees purchased the lots by means of a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated June 2, 1971, with the property 
legally described by the metes and bounds method.31 
In October of 1971, the Strawberry River Estates, Inc. 
contacted the Appellees again regarding the potential sale of an 
additional ten acres adjacent to the Appellees1 property. It was 
ultimately agreed that Strawberry River Estates, Inc. would include 
these ten acres with the original purchase of the Appellees at no 
additional cost.32 As such, a new Uniform Real Estate Contract was 
prepared in October of 1971, but was back dated to the original 
June 2, 1971, purchase date.33 
Approximately nine years later, the Appellees received a 
Warranty Deed for this property dated October 24, 1980.34 The 
legal metes and bounds description on the deed differed from that 
found in the Uniform Real Estate Contract used to purchase the 
30
 Rightly R. 373, 420. Kreis R. 467, 471 - 472. 
31
 Ex. P-6. Rightly R. 406. Rreis R. 468 - 469. 
32
 Ex. P-4. Rightly R. 371 - 374. 
33
 Ex. P-6. Rightly R. 376 - 378. 
34
 Ex. P-8. 
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property. The deed indicated that the property commenced 330 
rather than 320 feet west of the section line.35 
At the time Appellees received this deed, Mr. Kightly 
testified that he reviewed the deed and noticed that there was a 
discrepancy between the legal description contained in the deed and 
the legal description in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.36 He 
testified that he also received and reviewed two quitclaim deeds at 
about the same time and those legal descriptions were also 
inconsistent.37 Mr. Kightly testified that he knew there was a 
mistake, but "thought it might be just a typographical error."38 
However, Mr. Kightly indicated that despite the fact there was an 
error, he did nothing to determine why the legal description had 
been changed.39 
This Court sheds great light relevant to this case in a recent 
decision which addressed the statute of limitations and discovery 
rule and how they relate to professional negligence. In S e w v. 
Security Title Co., 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah 1993), this Court 
cites Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) to help set forth 
the general principle that: 
statute of limitations are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that 
35
 Compare Ex. P-6 and Ex. P-8. Kightly R. 412 - 413, 427 -
428. 
36
 R. 387; 412 - 413; 427. 
37
 Exs. D-l and D-2. R. 413 - 414; R 427. 
38
 R. 414. 
39
 R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428. 
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have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been 
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. . . . [and] mere ignorance of the existence 
of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations.40 
With respect to how the statute of limitations and the 
discovery rule interrelate, this Court then refers to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Klinqer, the case at hand's previous appeal. 
As in Sew, this case relates to the circumstance where the 
discovery rule may be applied if there exists "exceptional or 
unique circumstances". 
In Sew, this Court then stated that it is a threshold 
requirement that the plaintiff must show that the plaintiff did not 
know and could not have known that a cause of action existed so as 
to file an action within the limitation period. See Warren v. 
Provo City Corp. , 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). This Court went on to 
state that: 
for the [plaintiffs] to benefit from the discovery rule, 
and not have their claim barred by the four-year statute 
of limitations, the trial court had to find the 
[plaintiffs] neither knew of [defendants'] failure to 
protect their . . . interest . . . nor should have 
reasonably known of this failure until four years before 
they filed their lawsuit.41 
This Court then went on to analyze the evidence to determine when 
the plaintiffs "knew or should have known" of the existence of a 
problem. Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in the previous appeal 
in determining that the discovery rule should be applicable 
remanded this case back to the trial court. On remand, however, 
40
 Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. 
41
 Sew, 218 U.A.R. at 36. 
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the trial court errored in not ruling that the statute of 
limitations barred Appellees claim. 
In the instant case, the trial court made no finding as to 
when the Appellees discovered the facts necessary to pursue a cause 
of action.42 However, there was ample evidence presented that the 
fact were available and easily ascertainable in 1980 when the 
Appellees received the warranty and two quitclaim deeds with 
differing legal descriptions from the purchase contract.43 In 
fact, the Appellees testified that they "discovered" this error in 
1980, but did nothing.44 The evidence clearly supports the 
contention that the four year statute of limitations began to run, 
at the latest in 1980, when the Appellees testified that they knew 
of the error. 
Furthermore, the case at hand does not meet the "balancing 
test" as set forth in Sew. When determining whether or not the 
discovery rule should be applied, the court must balance the 
hardship of the statute of limitations with the prejudice to the 
defendant with respect to difficulties of proof due to the passage 
of time. 
In the case at hand, there was ample opportunity on the part 
of the Appellees to bring this action much earlier. When the 
Appellees discovered an error in the legal description in 1980, 
they did nothing. By not investigating, the Appellees allowed 
42
 See Findings of Facts. 
43
 Compare Ex. P-6, P-8, D-l, and D-2. 
44
 Rightly R. 413 - 414; 427 - 428. 
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more time to pass. As such, a total of approximately 14 years 
passed from the time the survey certificate was prepared before 
this action was brought. There is no question that memories have 
faded over this time. For example, the Appellees continually 
testified that they went to the surveyors office in Duchesne and 
requested that the survey be performed.45 This could not have 
happened because the surveyors did not have an office in Duchesne 
at this time. They were doing business out of their homes, and the 
office was not opened until some time later.46 
Also, not only have memories faded, but John Stafford, the 
member of the survey party who headed up the surveys in this area 
and was the principal party involved with the survey certificate, 
passed away and was therefore unavailable to testify. Furthermore, 
the trial court refused to admit the survey diary of Mr. Stafford 
which was made contemporaneously with the disputed events.47 It 
is clear that the passage of time has prejudiced Calder in his 
defense of this case due to the fact that memories have faded, 
responsible parties have disappeared, and key witnesses have passed 
away. 
Therefore, as of 1980, it is undisputed that a discrepancy in 
the legal descriptions existed. Appellees testified and it is 
undisputed that they knew of an error but decided not to 
45
 Kightly R. 378 - 379; 407; 416 - 417. 
46
 Ostler R. 533. 
47
 See Point III of this brief for the argument related to the 
admissibility of the survey diary as a business record pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(6). 
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investigate. The four year statute of limitations began to run 
from the time Appellees recognized the discrepancy. See Klinger v. 
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990). The Appellees should have 
discovered, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the facts 
which gave rise to the cause of action against Calder. 
Appellees did not bring this action until 1986 - more than 
four years after Appellees first learned that there was a problem 
with the legal description. The trial court, in the face of 
Appellees' testimony that they were aware of the discrepancies 
between the deeds and the uniform real estate contracts but decided 
not to investigate the problem, ruled in favor of the Appellees. 
The trial court errored by not dismissing this action against 
Calder as being time barred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT USED AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN 
CALCULATING THE AMOUNT TO AWARD TO APPELLEES. 
For a party to be entitled to damages under the theory of 
negligence, there must be a logical causal connection between the 
negligent act of the defendant and the damages claimed by the 
plaintiff. Proximate cause is ,f[t]hat cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting State v. Lawson# 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984)). No such 
causal connection exists between the negligence, if any, of Calder 
and the damages claimed by Appellees. 
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Furthermore, when there are other parties whose acts or 
negligence contributed to the damage received by the injured party, 
each party is responsible only for that damage which he caused, and 
not for the damage caused by another. See Utah Code Annotated §78-
27-40. 
a) Calder did not participate in the preparation of 
the documents used to transfer title to the 
Appellees. 
Appellees claimed against Calder damages from the "loss of the 
benefit of the bargain" for a sale of property, the most valuable 
of which Appellees never owned. The Appellees purchased the 
property under a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated June 2, 1971.48 
The contract provided a legal description of the property which 
Appellees purchased. Appellees testified that this contract, and 
the subsequent warranty deed, do not describe the property which 
they believed they agreed to purchase.49 
The contract was prepared and ownership interests were created 
approximately ten months before Calder signed the survey 
certificate.50 Calder had no part in the preparation of the 
contract or the deed, the legal transfer of the property.51 
According to the Appellees, these documents did not properly 
describe the property they intended to purchase.52 The property 
48
 Ex. P-6. 
49
 Kightly R. 404; Kreis R. 468 - 469, 474. 
50
 Ex. P-l; Kightly R. 407. 
51
 Calder R. 487, 503. Ostler R. 536 - 537, 540. 
52
 Kightly 377. Kreis R. 475. Calder R. 515 - 516. 
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as described in the contract was 1000 feet farther to the east than 
that which was represented to the Appellees by the Strawberry River 
Estates. Therefore, Calder's negligence in signing the 
certificate, if any, in no way altered what property the Appellees 
had already received from the Strawberry River Estates. 
b) Appellees did not use the legal description 
contained in the survey certificate in their 
attempted transfer of the property to the Klingers. 
Both Appellees and Mr. Wilkerson, Appellees' expert, testified 
that the valuable property in the location was on the west side of 
the creek.53 It is undisputed, as described above, that the 
Appellees never owned this property. That property was never part 
of the property covered by the Uniform Real Estate Contract nor 
part of the property conveyed to Appellees by way of the three 
deeds. Appellees subsequently made representations and "sold" to 
Klingers the "property" that Appellees never owned.54 
In this sale, the Appellees testified that they did not use 
the legal description contained in Calder's certificate, Appellees 
instead used the description contained in their warranty deed 
received in 1980 from Security Title.55 They were not relying on 
the accuracy of the certificate, but were relying on the accuracy 
of the warranty deed. The trial court erroneously found that 
Calder, by signing a plat map certificate containing the legal 
53
 Kightly R. 411 - 412. Wilkerson R. 436. 
54
 Kightly R. 411 - 412. Wilkerson R. 442. Kreis R. 474 -
475. 
55
 Compare P-6, P-7, and P-8. Kightly R. 390. 
23 
description contained in Appellees' purchase contract, was liable 
for Appellees' loss of the benefit of the sale where the Appellees 
used a different legal description. Therefore, no causal 
connection existed. The negligence, if any, on the part of Calder 
was superseded and cut off by the negligence of the party who 
prepared the warranty deed containing a different legal 
description, the same legal description which ultimately used to 
transfer the property to the Klingers. See Butterfield supra. 
c) The damages claimed by Appellees against Calder 
were not foreseeable. 
Furthermore, not to mention the fact that it is illogical to 
hold Calder liable for Appellees' attempt to sell property which 
they never owned, the value of that property was inflated due to an 
unforeseeable artificial spike in the real estate market due to the 
oil crises. The Appellees purchased the property in 1971 for 
$5,500.56 The value of the land area increased significantly and 
the Appellees contracted to sell the property to the Klinger in 
1983 for $32,000 on contract.57 Subsequently, the property values 
in the area fell back to their initial values and the Klingers were 
able to rescind the contract and reconvey the property to the 
Appellees.58 
As a result, the Appellees are in the same position now as 
they were when the purchased the property. They own the same 
Ex. P-6. 
Rightly R. 401 - 402. Wilkerson R. 436. 
Rightly R. 394 - 395. 
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property now, no more, no less, as they purchased in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract dated in June of 1971. The only difference is 
that the Appellees have attempted to recoup from Calder the profit 
they would have received when they attempted to sell property which 
they did not own. 
Therefore, it is not foreseeable that Calder could be held 
liable for Appellees attempt to sell property not owned by them, 
property with a description different than that contained in the 
certificate signed by Calder, or property that significantly 
increased due to an artificial spike. 
d) The trial court's finding of damages is not 
supported by the evidence. 
The trial court found that Calder was liable to Appellees for 
damages totaling $29,383.00 as contained in Appellees' Exhibit P-9. 
As part of section A. entitled "Loss on Sale/Recision" on Exhibit 
P-9, it lists as the selling price $32,000,59 less present value 
of $6,000, leaving a loss of $26,000.60 This is contradictory to 
the evidence presented at trial. 
Appellees' expert witness on real estate, Mr. Wilkerson, 
testified that the Appellees had received an offer to purchase the 
land for $10,000, but the Appellees, contrary to Mr. Wilkerson's 
advice, turned the offer down.61 When asked what the present value 
59
 The $32,000 was the list price for the more valuable 
property which the Appellees never owned. Therefore, this list 
price is inflated when it is used in comparison to present value of 
the less valuable property owned by the Appellees. 
60
 Ex. P-9. 
61
 R. 445, 450. 
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of the property was, Mr. Wilkerson testified that it was worth 
$8,000, not $6,000 as stated on Ex. P-9.62 
During closing arguments, counsel for Appellees set forth the 
damages being claimed against Calder. With respect to the losses 
incurred from the sale and the present market value of the 
property, Appellees' counsel stated: 
Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor who sold the property was very 
familiar with the area, is still familiar with the area, 
and is in real estate, testified that he felt the present 
market value of the land is around $8,000. My people 
lost the value of their bargain, the $32,000 which they 
sold the property for, less the $8,000. which the value 
is now $24,OOP.63 (emphasis added) 
Therefore, the damages as calculated on Ex. P-9 do not reflect 
the evidence presented. Appellees admit in their closing arguments 
that the present value of the property is not properly reflected in 
Ex. P-9. As such, the trial court's award of damages was clearly 
contrary to the evidence presented at trial. 
Appellees had received an offer for $10,000. This appears to 
be the most conclusive evidence of market value. Nevertheless, the 
judgment must, at a minimum, be reduced by at least $2,000 to 
properly reflect the evidence presented, 
e) Conclusion 
Accordingly, no logical causal connection has been shown by 
Appellees between the damages claimed by Appellees and any 
negligence on the part of Calder. Appellees were not damaged by 
Calderfs negligence in signing the plat certificate, the Appellees 
62
 R. 448. 
63
 Closing Arg. pg. 10. 
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were damaged due to the negligence of the person who prepared the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract which contained a legal description 
different that what the Appellees intended and believed they were 
purchasing. The trial court's decision to rescind the contract of 
the Appellees subsequent sale of the property was not due to any 
negligence on the part of Calder, but was due to the fact that the 
Appellees were trying to sell to the buyers property which they did 
not, and never did own. Furthermore, even if Calder were liable, 
the evidence presented does not support the amount of damages 
awarded to Appellees. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE THE 
BUSINESS DIARY KEPT BY JOHN STAFFORD, ONE OF THE 
SURVEYORS, WHO HAD DIED A FEW MONTHS BEFORE TRIAL. 
The survey diary of John Stafford was offered as evidence at 
trial as a business record. The diary which was recorded 
contemporaneously as the disputed events occurred would have been 
evidence to contradict testimony of Appellees including that 
Stafford was hired by Strawberry River Estates and not Appellees to 
perform the survey work. Further, the diary would have 
contradicted the testimony of Appellees that Stafford was requested 
to survey lots 30 and 31 and not the metes and bounds description 
from the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The other two members of 
the survey crew were present and authenticated the diary.64 The 
64
 Ostler R. 528, 532 - 533. Proffered testimony of Gunderson 
R. 546. 
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trial court would not allow the diary to be introduced as 
evidence.65 The refusal to allow the diary into evidence was 
reversible error. See State v. Bertul, 644 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, the trial court improperly denied the 
introduction of Mr. Stafford's survey diary as a being a business 
record.66 Pursuant to Rule 803(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
entitled "Records of regularly conducted activity." It states: 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the memorandum, report, or record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source 
of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and 
calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit. 
In accordance with the above mentioned rule, the diary meets 
all of the requirements. The diary is a written record of events 
which was made at the time the acts occurred. It was prepared by 
a person with knowledge of the events, John Stafford. The diary 
was kept in the course of regularly conducted business, which is 
the normal practice of the business. All of this information was 
presented by qualified witnesses, Floyd Ostler and Merrill 
Gunderson, Mr. Stafford's business parties and actual members of 
65
 Court R. 508 - 511, 532 - 533. 
66
 Court R. 510. 
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the survey crew at the time the survey diary was made.67 There is 
no evidence whatsoever that this diary lacks trustworthiness. 
The trial court's ruling to deny the admittance of this diary 
may be overturned where the court has abused its discretion. State 
ex rel. Marcruez, 560 P.2d 342 (Utah 1977). 
As provided by Rule 803(6), it is necessary that a qualified 
person lay the foundation for the records to be entered into 
evidence. In Hansen v. Heath, 211 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1993), 
the court addressed the situation regarding "a qualified person." 
It that case, the person who prepared the record was not available 
to testify. The Utah Supreme Court allowed another witness lay the 
foundation for the record. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although Freedman was not Woo's treating physician, rule 
803(6) allows any qualified witness to lay the proper 
foundation for a record, not just the custodian or the 
person who created the record, (emphasis original) Hansen 
at 18. 
In footnote 17 of the Hansen decision, the Utah Supreme Court also 
cites Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.. 939 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1991) 
which indicates that under the Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6), 
"the person testifying need not have prepared the records nor have 
personal knowledge of the accuracy of the information contained in 
them." Id. at 272. 
At trial, the foundation for the admission of Mr. Stafford's 
survey diary was laid through testimony from Floyd Ostler and the 
proffered testimony of Merrill Gunderson as required by Rule 
67
 Ostler R. 528 - 533. Proffered testimony of Gunderson R. 
546. 
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803(6). Mr. Ostler and Mr. Gunderson were members of the survey 
crew with Mr. Stafford and were familiar with the diary, and 
testified that they had reviewed the diary and it contained 
information regarding work they had performed together including 
the property disputed in this case.68 
This diary made by Mr. Stafford was made during the 
performance of surveys recording the activities and jobs performed 
by the survey group.69 It was the normal practice of the surveying 
group to keep such diaries.70 The trial court incorrectly ruled 
that this diary was inadmissible as being hearsay when it should 
have admitted the diary into evidence under the business record 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
Mr. Stafford, the author of the diary, was not available to 
testify at trial. Before trial, Mr. Stafford passed away in Alaska 
from leukemia. In any event, the diary, in accord with Utah Rule 
of Evidence 803(6), does not require the availability of the 
declarant if it was within the regular practice of the business to 
retain such diary as shown by the testimony of qualified persons. 
A showing that the trial court's acts are "beyond the limits 
of reasonability" indicates an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court. State v. Dunn, 208 U.A.R. 100 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-240, (Utah 1992). As such, in this 
case, the trial court clearly abused his discretion. As set forth 
68
 Ostler R. 528 - 533. 
69
 Ostler R. 532. 
70
 Ostler R. 532. 
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above, there was adequate foundation laid as required by Rule 
803(6) and the trial courts refusal to admit the diary into 
evidence was clearly erroneous. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST 
FROM THE DATE OF THE RECONVEYANCE. 
The case at hand is an action for professional negligence 
which is an action in tort. See Restatement. 2d, Torts, §289 
Comment m; Prosser & Keeton §32. Interest awarded as damages 
differs from interest provided by contractual agreement. Interest 
awarded as damages is allowed only to compensate for the delay in 
recovery of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. See 22 
Am.Jur. 2d, Damages §§179, 189 et. seq. 
The trial court in this case awarded the Appellees prejudgment 
interest from the time the property was reconveyed back to the 
Appellees on July 30, 1987.71 Prejudgment interest has been 
awarded in construction contract or other contract cases where a 
court can fix the damages as of a particular time and the amount of 
the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Jorgensen 
v. John Clay £ Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). 
In a case which is strikingly similar to this case, this Court 
determined that the prevailing party was not entitled to 
prejudgment interest. In Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, & 
Gunnel1, 784 P,2d 475 (Utah App. 1989), a case which involves a 
Judgment R. 304 - 306. 
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negligent property survey, the plaintiff claimed damages against 
the surveyor for loss of value to the property due to the negligent 
survey. This Court cited the Utah Supreme Court and stated: 
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount of loss 
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed 
from that time and not from the date of the judgment. On 
the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy, such as in case of 
personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of character, 
false imprisonment, etc., the amount of damage must be 
ascertained and assessed by the by the trier of the fact 
at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is 
not allowed, (emphasis added) (citing Biork v. April 
Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)). 
This Court goes to state that for damages to be calculated 
with mathematical certainty, the damages must be ascertained: 
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow 
in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past 
as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot 
be measured by any fixed standards of value, (emphasis 
added) (Price-Orem citing Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. , 88 
P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907)). 
In analyzing the facts of that case, and the method used by 
the trial court in determining the damages, the appellate court 
stated: 
In particular, damages ascertained by determining the 
fair market value of real property before and after the 
damage cannot be determined with mathematical precision, 
and may be inherently uncertain . . . The damages are not 
determinable with mathematical precision, and although 
the evidence is sufficient to support the damage award, 
it is far too uncertain to support a prejudgment interest 
award. (emphasis added) Price-Orem at 482-83. 
See also Anesthesiologists Association v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 
212 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1993). 
32 
The trial court in this case at hand determined that Calder 
was negligent in its signing of the survey certificate.72 The 
court found no breach of contract. The trial court awarded 
Appellees the "Loss on Sale" and calculated the damages by taking 
the sales price, less present value of the property.73 The trial 
court's use of the present market value of the property is, at 
best, an estimation. Further, the present market value of the 
property which was testified to, and being used to calculate 
damages, was the value of the property at the time of trial, not 
the value of the property at the time of reconveyance.74 
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded pre-judgment interest back to 
the date of reconveyance. This method of damage calculation is 
inherently uncertain and without mathematical precision as 
described in Price-Orem. As it was found to be improper in Price-
Orem, it is likewise improper for the trial court to award 
prejudgment interest in this case. 
Furthermore, the trial court's denial of Calder's request for 
hearing with respect to the objections to this award was erroneous. 
As such, the trial court errored, as a matter of law, in awarding 
Appellees prejudgment interest, and the award must be reversed. 
Minute Entry R. 291. Conclusions of Law R. 302. 
Minute Entry R. 291. Ex. P-9. 
Wilkerson R. 448; Closing Arg. pg. 10. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED COSTS IN THIS CASE 
INCLUDING THE FILING FEES OF THE PRIOR APPEAL, THE 
WITNESS FEES IN THE FIRST TRIAL IN WHICH APPELLANT WAS 
NOT A PARTY, THE WITNESS FEES FOR EXPERTS OF APPELLANT, 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE FIRST TRIAL, PRINTING COSTS OF THE 
BRIEFS IN THE FIRST APPEAL, PHOTOCOPIES, ETC. 
The generally accepted premise regarding costs is that the 
award of costs should be narrowly made to guard against abuse by 
those better financially equipped lest the cost of seeking justice 
become prohibitive for the financially ill-equipped. Highland 
Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) does not specifically 
define costs, but the generally accepted definition of costs under 
this rule includes: "...those fees which are required to be paid to 
the court and to witnesses, and for which the statues authorize to 
be included in the judgment." 
There is a distinction to be understood between the legitimate 
and taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of litigation which may be 
ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs. 
Consistent with that distinction, the courts hold that expert 
witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation unless the statute 
expressly so provides. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, v. 
Dasakalas, 785 P.2d 1112, (Utah App. 1989) citing Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). 
In Frampton, the award of costs in excess of those expressly 
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, witness fees and 
34 
preparation of model, photographs and certified copies of documents 
was improper even though the costs represented the actual expenses 
incurred. The fact that the Utah Supreme Court has on occasion 
approved taxing of expense of depositions as costs should not be 
taken as opening the door to other expenses of the character 
claimed the instant case. Id. 
Appellees' Memorandum of Costs claimed certain items as being 
"costs" related to this action.75 Despite the fact that many of 
the "costs" submitted were contrary to the trial court's 
disposition of the case in its Minute Entry, and also contrary to 
applicable law, the trial court granted these costs to the 
Appellees without allowing Calder a hearing to argue the 
appropriateness of the costs.76 
Witness Fees77 
Witness fees in the amount of $17.00 a day, plus mileage, are 
permitted by Utah Code Annotated §21-5-4. However, Appellees only 
state names and amounts for each witness. Appellees do not provide 
a breakdown as to miles traveled, nor a basis for the necessity of 
the witnesses. 
However, the most obvious error is that Appellees fail to tell 
the court that the witnesses list includes witness compensation 
from the first trial in Duchesne County. Listed are Glen H. Calder 
75
 Memorandum of Costs R. 292 - 295. 
76
 Minute Entry R. 291. Calder's Objection R. 307 - 310. 
Calderfs Request for Hearing R. 311 - 312. Judgment R. 304 - 306. 
77
 R. 293. 
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and Gerald Condor as receiving witness fees and compensation for 
mileage for their testimony in the first trial.78 Calder was not 
a party to the trial due to the fact that Calder fs motion for 
summary judgment was granted by that court prior to trial.79 Mr. 
Conder did not testify at the trial before Judge Sawaya. 
Nevertheless, Appellees are attempting to recover these as costs 
attributable to this trial. 
Therefore, Appellees attempt to recover their costs which were 
incurred in a previous trial is wholly inappropriate and should be 
disallowed. 
Clerk Fees80 
Appellees are attempting to recover fees relating to an appeal 
from a ruling from the Duchesne County court action. Appellees 
have claimed in their Memorandum of Cost the filing fee for the 
appeal. Appellees argued in closing arguments and included this 
cost under item "E. Additional Expenses" as part of its "Schedule 
of Damages" which was submitted to the trial court.81 The trial 
court, however, in ruling in favor for Appellees stated that 
Appellees were entitled only to those damages as set forth under 
Items A and B.82 The trial court, therefore, ruled in its Minute 
R. 293. 
R. 198 - 199. 
R. 292 - 293. 
Closing Arg. pg. 11; Ex. P-9. 
Minute Entry R. 291. 
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Entry decision that these filing fees were not to be part of the 
j udgment. 
The attempt to recover this filing fee from the Utah Supreme 
Court for the appeal of the Duchesne County action is 
inappropriate, contrary to the Minute Entry of the trial court and 
not taxable to the judgment at hand. 
Constable Fees83 
Constable fees maybe recoverable if they are related to the 
action at hand. However, Appellees have not provided any evidence 
that the costs claimed are related to the proceeding before Judge 
Sawaya. 
Reporter Fees84 
The Utah Supreme court has permitted the taxing of the expense 
of taking a deposition only if the deposition was taken in good 
faith and appeared to be essential for development and presentation 
of the case and taken for potential use as trial testimony. See 
Frampton. No such showing has been made by Appellees either by 
affidavit or legal memorandum. 
Appellees are also claiming as a cost the expense of a copy of 
the trial transcript from the Duchesne County trial of which Calder 
was not a party.85 It is apparent that this transcript was ordered 
to be used by the Appellees on their appeal from the Duchesne 
R. 293. 
R. 294. 
R. 198 - 199. 
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County decision• There was no need for this transcript for the 
prosecution of this case. 
Appellees are attempting again, to shoehorn in costs from the 
Duchesne County action and appeal. The transcript is not a taxable 
cost related to this litigation. As was stated above, the trial 
court has already denied the Appellees' claim for expenses relating 
to the first appeal. 
Miscellaneous Costs86 
Appellees attempt to recover the costs of printing its 
appellate brief relating to the appeal from the Duchense County 
rulings. Once again, the trial court in its Minute Entry denied 
the appeal expenses. 
Also, Appellees' claim for an unknown United Parcel Service 
charge, a request for a certificate of incorporation and 
photocopies of unknown origin and value to this case. These 
charges are either contrary to the trial court's Minute Entry or 
not appropriate to this case and are not permissible under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d). 
Although a trail court may have discretion in regard to the 
allowance of certain costs, it also has a duty to guard against any 
excesses or abuse in the taxing thereof. Id. at 773-774. The 
trial court in this case utterly refused to consider Calder's 
objections to Appellees' Memorandum of Costs and Request for 
Hearing.87 Appellees served by mail its Memorandum of Costs on 
86
 R. 294. 
87
 R. 319. 
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December 18, 1992. Before Calder even had filed his opposition, 
the trial court signed the Judgement awarding the costs to the 
Appellees on December 23, 1992.88 Clearly this is an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court and contrary to the 
Minute Entry ruling made by the trial court.89 As such, the award 
of these costs must be reversed. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CALDER'S OBJECTIONS TO 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DOING SO 
WITHOUT EVEN A HEARING ON THE OBJECTIONS PARTICULARLY 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT HAD ISSUED ONLY A VERY BRIEF 
CONCLUSORY MINUTE ENTRY, WITHOUT ANY FINDINGS OF FACT, ON 
ITS DECISION OF THE CASE. 
At the conclusion of the trail the court issued a brief minute 
order regarding its findings in which it stated in pertinent part 
that: 1. Calder was negligent in the survey of the property which 
resulted in plaintiff selling wrong property and that 
Plaintiff(sic) has sustained damages; and 2. [Appellees] are 
granted judgment per [Appellees1] schedule (Exhibit P-9) Items A 
and B. in the amount of $29,383, interest and costs.90 
The trial court, however, does not state in its minute order 
anything about any particular findings of fact, prejudgment 
interest, etc. On December 18, 1992, counsel for Appellees mailed 
88
 R. 304 - 306, 
89
 R. 291. 
90
 R. 291. 
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its proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.91 On 
December 23, 1992, the trial court signed Appellees' prepared 
Findings of Fact without change.92 On the same day, the trial 
court also signed the Judgment prepared by Appellees which 
includes, for the first time, the provision for prejudgment 
interest.93 The court signed the documents before the time period 
for Calder to object or debate the findings had expired. 
On December 29, 1992, Calder served his objections to the 
Findings of Fact and objections to the form of the Judgment, 
specifically to the included costs and to the prejudgment 
interest.94 Calder at the same time requests a hearing for 
argument as to the Findings of Fact, Judgment and Memorandum of 
Costs.95 On January 25, 1993, counsel for Appellees serves his 
Reply to Calder's objections to the Findings of Fact, Judgment and 
Memorandum of Costs.96 Of interest, Appellees respond only as to 
the findings of fact, but does not contest the objections to the 
cost or the judgment. 
On January 29, 1993, the court issues a minute entry order 
stating the Calder's request for a hearing has been submitted and 
R. 303. 
R. 296 - 303. 
R. 304 - 306. 
R. 307 - 310. 
R. 311 - 312. 
R. 313 - 318. 
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the court stated that the findings and judgment reflect the courts 
decision and no hearing would be granted.97 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration clearly 
states the following: 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the 
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing 
the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court 
finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is 
frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided, (emphasis added) 
It is clear that in the case at hand that Calder's request for 
hearing should have been granted. Not only did the court make its 
decision on the Findings of Fact prior to reading Calder's 
opposition, the trial court did not incorporate in its minute entry 
order some of the crucial and offensive sections of Appellees1 
judgment order and findings of fact such as the pre-judgment 
interest.98 
Two cases in this jurisdiction that discuss this matter are 
Bover Co. v. Lignell. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977) and Alta Industries 
v. Hurst, 205 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1993). 
In Bover the court stated: 
while we do not recommend that the trial judge 
"mechanically adopt" the findings as prepared by the 
prevailing party, we certainly do not find such to be the 
fact in this case. After the proposed "findings" were 
submitted by defendants' counsel, the plaintiff filed 
97
 R. 319. 
98
 R. 291, 296 - 303. 
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objections and proposed amendments which were argued 
before the trail court who ultimately adopted the 
findings as submitted. The discretion of adopting the 
findings as submitted to the trail court is exclusively 
in that court as long as the findings are not contrary to 
the evidence, (citing Merrill v. Bailey & Sons, Co., 106 
P.2d 255 (Utah 1940). 
The Alta court further discussed the Bover case noting that 
The court took an active role in the preparation of the 
findings. In so concluding we relied on the fact that 
prior to adopting the prevailing party's findings the 
court considered the opposing party's objections and 
proposed amendments and conducted a hearing on the 
propriety of the proposed findings. 
In Alta the trial judge took an active role in preparation of 
the findings than did the trial judge in Bover. In Alta not only 
were objections field and a hearing conducted, but the trial judge 
prepared an initial memorandum decision containing findings of fact 
before instructing Steelco to prepare additional findings 
consistent with his decision. It is clear that trial court in Alta 
did not mechanically adopt the findings. The appellate court, 
therefore, found that the findings were entitled to the normal 
deference accorded by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a) on 
appeal. 
In the case at bar, the trial court undertook none of the 
actions taken by the courts in Alta or Bover. Instead, the trial 
court signed the Findings of Fact before even reading Calder's 
objections, and ultimately refused to grant a hearing as to 
Calder's objections to the judgment form, costs and findings. 




The claim of Appellees, based upon a theory of negligence, 
should have been dismissed by reason of the four-year statute of 
limitations. Appellees testified that they discovered that a 
problem existed at the time of their receipt of deeds in 1980. The 
trial court errored in not finding that the action was time barred 
in the face of this testimony along with the various documents. 
This ruling should be reversed, and this action against Calder be 
dismissed. 
The trial court used an improper measure of damages in 
calculating the amount to award to Appellees. Due to the factors 
as presented above, there was no proper or logical causal 
connection between the negligence of Appellant, if any, and the 
damages claimed by Appellees. Furthermore, the evidence does not 
support the amount of damages awarded. As such, the damages 
awarded against Calder must, at a minimum, be reduced to reflect 
the evidence presented. 
The trial court improperly excluded from evidence the business 
diary kept by John Stafford, one of the surveyors, who had died in 
Alaska a few months before trial. The diary meets the requirements 
as set forth in the Rules of Evidence as a business record. 
Furthermore, adequate foundation was laid by the testimony of the 
witnesses. The diary provides contemporaneous recorded evidence to 
contradict Appellees' claims. This Court must remand this case to 
trial with the direction to admit this diary into evidence. 
43 
The trial court improperly awarded pre-judgment interest in 
this case running from the date of the reconveyance. Pre-judgment 
interest can only be awarded when the damages can be calculated 
with mathematical certainty. The award in this case against Calder 
was based in negligence, and calculated using estimated property 
market value. Case law clearly indicates that such calculations 
are not sufficiently certain to justify pre-judgment interest. As 
such, this Court must reverse the trial courts awarding of pre-
judgment interest. 
The trial court improperly assessed costs in this case 
including the filing fees of the prior appeal, the witness fees in 
the first trial in which Appellant was not a party, the witness 
fees for experts of Appellant, the transcript of the first trial, 
printing costs of the briefs in the first appeal, photocopies, etc. 
The trial court erroneously awarded cost contrary to the Minute 
Entry decision. This Court must reverse the trial court's awarding 
of costs which are contrary to the Minute Decision and those not 
provided as being taxable by statute. 
The trial court improperly denied the objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court did so 
without even granting a hearing on the objections. This is 
particularly egregious when the trial court had issued only a very 
brief conclusory minute entry, without any findings of fact, on its 
decision of the case. As such, the action must be remanded for 




RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ° day of August, 1993. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: 
Robert F./Babcock 
Brian J. Babcock 
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Certificate of Surrey 
S/2*rtbar 
T# Glen'H'# Caldor, do hereby certify that I am 
a Registered Land Surveyor in the State of Utah, and 
that the plat described hereon portraya a aurvey made 
by XLM or under my direction.' I further certify that 
the above plat correotly ahowa the true dtrnenalona of 
the property aurveyed and of the improvements located 
thtrfion; and further that there are no encroachments 
on said property* . •
 / r . 
^Tv 
r A U 
Clen H*. Calder 
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WILSON a CALDER 
UINITUKJML JULAL, fcSTATli CONTRACT 
"This is a legally binding form, if not unders tood, seek competent adv ice . " 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this ? » L _ day of f-VB* , A. D., 19 7 1
 t 
by and between Strawberry River Estate8, Inc, 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and E u g » n e E . & H e l e n I . K i g h t l y & H a i r y P . & P e g g y R . K P B I S 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of ffig P l ^ r e e A v e n u e O g d e n U t a h 3 9 3 ^ 6 5 
5171 Morr Mont Drive Salt Lake City, Utah 277-3765 
- t J L , 
2. . WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agTees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the countv of D u c h e g n e
 t s ta te of Utah, to-wit: . 
ADDRESS 
More particularly described as follows: - # 
Beginning 990 • South of the Suuth line of Section 11, Township U South, Range 
8 West, USM, to center of Red Creek, Thence West 132*!/-Thence South 6601, Thence Eejfet 
1320f, Thenceforth 165 f , Thence East 1320f, Thence North 3301, Thence West 1320 f f 
Thence>^i]^i§fl65, to beginning point at center of Red Creek. Consisting of Thirty (30) acres and no more. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of * 1 ^ 
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty -nniw <f 5»550«00 \ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order 3 4 2 1 S o u t h 5 0 E a s t B o u n t i f u l , U t a h 8 4 0 1 0 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: Thirteen Hundred
 ( |1.300.00 } 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of j 4 i ^ t ) v J » W shall be paid as follows: 
$86.19 or more per month payable on the l e t day of each month commencing 
on July 1, 1971, and payable each rconth thereafter until paid in fu l l . 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the day of *>UI1B ^ ^g 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from J u n e * t l y / 1 o n a j j unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of ±±£i£ per cent ( ~ <fc) per annum. The Buyer, a t his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
6. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
(J. It is undprstnnH that there nrA««mflv *>vi<:tc an nhlicratinn atrainef eot/4 nrnnartu in favnr /if • It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of . 
T 1,020.00 as o{ May 1, 1971 
. with an unpaid balance of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following — . 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed &lgflX percent 
( " 9c) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the Aggregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all
 / taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these^'premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
tha t there are no assessments againsVsaid premises except the following: 
None 
Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the paymeni 01 nis oongauons agamsi saia property. 
JUBB 1 . 1971 2. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after w — 
IS. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a corn-
acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or % 
to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may'appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
iums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
em, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
h until paid. 
L5. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
IC. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
. . Thirty 
payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 2— 
r, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
days thereafter, the 
.. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at wil! of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the. Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In. the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
•red to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
> by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
he amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
Ls herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended 
nents shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
es to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
e described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
r through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
le purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
i of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
s present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
•ence to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
hat the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
ccrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
sdy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
therwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
jrs, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
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"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice " 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 2nd day of $tn€ » A - D-» l g 7 / » 
h\ and between _ 
hereinafter designated a." the Sell* i, and <$-ymc £ $ Helm L KighUff & * W y fl<? fluffy % K**tU 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of ?l& Tlenct Asmtie Qgdm. iV/rri J92-MI5 
?/7/ / W flbni tUtve. Soli Lake CJUb^Uich. 277-176$ 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in 
the county of Lhtr*fnf , State of Utah, to-wit: 
ADDRESS 
Mon> particularly described as follows: 
Beginning, ai a fkUvt 320 / W Wedi and 990 £eei SouA at ike NoxAmAi 
( OAfl&l OL Section It. TounAtp 4 SowA and %*** 8 VIvO. U.S.IK, tkenct 
fiW 26kO fevL ihmot South 660 Uei, iktnce. J W 26W feet, Atnce. 
NOA& 660 fjtei io foirvt of. Beplnrunp. (pnALeUng. of /o/tfy acted. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of 
Thousand Flue Hundred Fipbf and no/100 - • — Dollars <* Sj 550*00 > 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order _ IRJ6 W S flhJn .y., W / lake Q*jf$ H*.Mtt5 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: TfuAJCm MwvUed and no/fOO - - - -— (iJ^JQO^OO ) 
ca^h, the receipt of which is. hereby acknowledged, and the balanci of $ %• 2^0*00 shall be paid a* follows 
$86.19 OA mote pe/t monJk payable, on Ae / ~ i clou of. tack mordh axrmencinp 
on July /, 19719 ond payable each monik AeAjeapteA until paid In faLL 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the . 2nd — day of _ fane , wjl_. 
»l Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from $Un£ 2p 1971 on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price a t the rate of t/ohx per cent (—!•___ %) per annum. The Buyer, a t his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, auch excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6 It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in lavoi of _ V^J/pff 
. flcmchfA, (Inc,—. . . _ _______ with an unpaid balance of 
$ I, OPT).00 , as of % I, 1971 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following . 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed f/y^^ percent 
( _ a & c — % ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the pnncipol due hereunder ha» been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
_ _ 4_ttt£ . _ _ _ _____ _ . _ 
P-6 
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 w .*. .- . .— «..«** •«**«» wi«v «c wm not o e n u i u n ine payment 01 bis obligations against aaid property. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after — ff«* /, /?7/ 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on aaid premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ 
ind to assign aaid insurance to the Seller as his interests may'appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
remiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
f them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
nd paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rate of 54 of one percent per 
lonth until paid. 
15. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
aid premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
ny payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within 
eller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
ThJbdty days thereafter, the 
___ Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five days after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of aaid premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land and become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property aold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the aaid premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
ferred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
me by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ents herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such a time as such suspended 
yments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
rees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
ove described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
rm of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It i« hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
erence to aaid property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto ntnr\^ 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
nedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
sors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHERECxF/theyiaid parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
it above written. /y / * * C a — J L , . ^ . , Ofa. 
•ned in the presence &O£OAM4, Inc. 
* % 











Recorded at Request o f — 
a t . . . . _ . M . Fee Paid $ „ 
by.^ _ I»J1- R'-M.L Vagi IU-f.i_ 
Mail tax notice to . ..Address-
WARRANTY DEED 
EUGENE E. RlLNlNi MM 1 III I RIGHTLY, HARRY D, KRE1S and 
Of S a l t Lake C i t y • County of S a l t Lake 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
>ARNETT, 
grantor s 
, State of Utah, hereby 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J. KLINGER, husband and w i f e , as j o i n t t e n a n t s and 
not as t e n a n t s in. common, wi th f u l l r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p ami nnt. as t e n a n t s 
i n common. 
of 
- • - TE N - a n ::i o th e i g o od 01 
the fol lowing described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
n i € i i i l c i a 1 i ( i i i -
Duchesne 
grantee 
for the sum of 
— _ DOLLARS, 
County, 
B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t 330 f e e t West and 990 f e e t South of the N o r t h e a s t Corner of 
S e c t i o n 1 1 , Township 4 S o u t h , Range 8 West , Uintah S p e c i a l base & M e r i d i a n , thence 
West 2640 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 660 f e e t ; thence East 2640 f e e t ; thence North 660 
f e e t t o the poiiil u! b e g i n n i n g . 
SUBJECT to a l l e x i s t i n g easements and r i g h t s - o f - w a y • 
EXCEPTING there from a l l o i l , g a s , and minera l r i g h t s , 
TOGETHER w i t h a l l improvements and appurtenances t h e r e t o b e l o n g i n g . 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a p e r p e t u a l easement and r i g h t - o l way hh.O feet wide 
for road purposes over and a c r o s s the property of the Grantor and property of 
S e c u r i t y T i t l e Company, Trustese named as Grantor i n tha t c e r t a i n S p e c i a l Warranty 
Deed dated October 2 4 , 1980 , recorded Apri1 10 , 1981 , i n Book A-81 page 4 9 2 , Duchesne 
County , U t a h , and a l s o over and a c r o s s the s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y a t a l o c a t i o n to be 
m u t u a l l y de termined and agreed by the p a r t i e s h e r e t o , or t h e i r s u c c e s s o r s and a s s ^ n * 
t o the end t h a t a t a l l t imes there w i l l be a v a i l a b l e tjfr-ijflftpy t i e s or t h e i r 
s u c c e s s o r s or a s s i g n s r e a s o n a b l e road r i g h t - o f ^ w j g f i f c f ^ P B l W M s and e g r e s s t o and 
from the a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t y of S e c u r i t y T i t J f i f c < ^ p a R H t J i t ^ e , and the lands 
d e s c r i b e d and conveyed h e r e i n . 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor , this 
J u l y
 f A. D, 19 
/ f 7 / 
Signed in the Presence of &fmtfi*&/4 
day of 
Sugepe E. Kigl h t l 
^ ^ z&c 
Helen L. K i g h t f y CS "&& JS> 
SPECIAL 'WARRANTY DEED ms**.^^ 
(CORPORATE FORM) / (>'/% &J*>cs<<^ Cc/. 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee, a corporation organized and existing under the 
laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, through 
or under it to 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS and PEGGY R. KREIS 
BARNETT, a l l as tenants in common. 
of Salt Lake City, Utah 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Duchesne 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
County, 
BEGINNING at a point 330 feet West and 990 feet South of the Northeast 
Corner of Section 11, Township 4 South and Range 8 West, Uintah Special 
Meridian; thence West 2640 fee t ; thence South 660 f e e t ; thence East 2640 
fee t ; thence North 660 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO easements, covenants, r e s t r i c t i o n s , r ights of way and reserva-
tions appearing of record and taxes for a l l property taxes . 
SUBJECT TO AND TOGETHER WITH a perpetual easement and right of way 66 
feet wide for road purposes over and across the property of the Grantor 
and also over and across the subject property at a locat ion to be mutually 
determined and agreed by the parties hereto or the ir successors and 
assigns to the end that at a l l times there w i l l be avai lable to the part ies 
or their successors or assigns reasonable road right of ways for ingress 
and egress to and from the adjoining property of Grantor and the lands 
described and conveyed herein. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto 
affixed by its duly authorized officers this 24th day of October
 t A.D., 19 B0 
1LL4J11M. 
:KARLES G. MILLER Secretary. 
(CORPORATE SEAL) - • *-• 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee 
By 
JjLA ^..^S^M^xJi^ 
CRAIG F. TH0MSEN Vice President. 
STATE OF UTAH/." 
County of Salt Lake 
ss 
On the 24th day of October ,A.D. 1980 
personally appeared before me CRAIG F. THOMSEN and CHARLES G. MILLER 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said CRAIG F. THOMSEN 
is the Vi coresident, and he, the said CHARLES G. MILLER is the Secretary 
Df SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, Trustee, and that the within and foregoing instrument 
was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors 
•tnd said CRAIG F. THOMSEN and CHARLES G. MILLER 
»ach duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
s the seal of said corporation. 
AM ...ft.J&^u^ , , Notary Public, 
vly commission expires .J?.?-/A.5./.81_ My residence is Salt Lake City, Utah 
KIGHTLY. et al vs. CALDER 
SCHEDULE OF DAMAGES 
A. Loss on Sa 1 e/Recisiofi: 
Selling price 40 acres at $800 per acre 32,000,00 
Less: Present value 4 0 acres at $150 per acre (6,000.0 
$ 26,000.00 
B. CIosi nq L1 osLf-» I 
Commission to Rec r 3,^uu.uo 
Title Insurance 163.00 
Document fee 2 0.00 
j , «3 o J • 'L v 
$ 2 9 , 3 8 3 . 0 0 
C. Payment t o K l i n a e r s : 
(,"»H t 1 e m e n l 111 hnji^iiii >ni , i i JI l. | , M I i 
R e - S u r v e y - C h r i s t e n s e n 
TOTAL 
E. Additional Expenses: 
Appeal Costs Summary Judgment dismissed 
Filing fees, preparation Briefs, 
Attorney fees $ 5,630,30 
300. 
$ 41,683.00 
? in DISTRlCTCOURTDUCHESiii 
C T A T C A r u T H U 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF , 9V_CH?W OUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ROGER K.MABETI, Clerk 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL J, 
KLINGER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, PEGGY 
R. KREIS BARNETT, UNITED FARM 
AGENCY, INC., and GERALD W. 
WILKERSON, 
Defendants. 
.4 JUL 6*8?\ 
Civil No. 86-CV-68D 
The Court having heard and reviewed the evidence and having 
duly considered that evidence in light of the cases cited by 
counsel, now finds: 
1. The legal description set forth in the deeds and 
Trust Deed did not include the property west of the creek, 
2. Plaintiffs and Defendants were mistaken as to the 
location of the property described in the contract documents. 
3. The mistake was a material one, it being shown by 
the evidence that the parcel of land known as the Conder pro-
perty was used by all parties during their occupation of the 
premises, and 
4. Plaintiffs relied upon the representations of 
Defendants and their agent as to the location of the property and 




5 I ] c i :i ntd ffs 1 iai ; e enci imbei :: eci 1 ;he property to the State 
of Utah for the conservatioi I loan. 
6 Tl le work done on tl le creek did not benefit the 
slibject pi: oper t^ 
The Cour t, there fore
 # coneludes: 
1. p1a I nt i f f s are ent i 11ed to res c ind the contract on 
the bet sis <> f the mi i t::i ial nii stake of fact. si lb ject !:: .c tl: ICE condi t i on 
stated below. 
2. Rescission is properly granted only if the property 
is rerunvcyt'd in Ijcftiidaii I •> fin ul <ni» n in i nitl»I'diic *e. 
3, 1> 1ai n 11 £ f s are ent i 11ed to r ecover t he amoun^ ^f 
the purchase price , "taxes paid of $ 1 1 , .1 r> 7 , 0 1 and interest thereon 
in the sum oi :, ,!, 11» 'J Ml, f"ofdlin«j ', I "
 ( i1'. M 
4, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover from Defen-
dants any portion of the con?'^v.":f ! rT loan. 
Base,. n thp foreaoing T -. . - , IE 'ac !: a :i: id Coi ICII isi oi: :i s of 
Law, i t :- !;• r^ . •: icred: 
1 m s
 s h a n reconvey by warranty deed the 
property desc: ,, . n the contract documents, fr ee ai id clear » £ 
any encumbi a^c , -^ ts . • hall replace fences or fence posts or 
other improvements wliich were on the subjec t property in July, 
1983. 
2. - .nveyance a 5; s(.-f. *"•;•: i" AJ> vi I s accomplished, 
Plai nti ffs si - - •- M ^ent. n u m ana after that date 
in the sum of $13,851-59. 
014 1 
3. If the property cannot be reconveyed free of 
encumbrance within ninety (90) days, rescission will not be 
allowed and Defendants will be entitled to their remedies under 
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. 
DATED this day of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Q^&t*t^€^> c>-> uLj^i 
cc: Rick J. Sutherland 
E. H. Fankhauser 
014o 
00150 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendants 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 





ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J, KLINGER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
5 EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN 
•J L. KIGHTLY, et al. 
Defendants, 
* SUMMARY JUDGMENT 








Third Party Defendant having heretofore filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment and the Court having considered the 
pleadings and memoranda, denied the Third Party Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and thereafter the Third Party 
Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider its Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and each of the parties having submitted additional 
Memorandums; and the Court, having reconsidered Third Party 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment; and having reviewed the 
pleadings and memoranda, made its ruling as of June-J7^; 13.87; 
7 ^ DISTRICT COUF tDUCHES;:, 
now, in accordance therewith: 
CC72 r^-7 
0 1 9 U ROGER* .ttASEn.ClcK 
198 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Court's 
previous ruling denying Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is set aside. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Third Party 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the Third 
Party Complaint against Third Party Defendant is dismissed. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this c^/S'r day of .September, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
'—rt DENNIS L. DRANEY DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
ma 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
iled to R-ick J. Sutherland, Attorney for Plaintiff, 3760 
Highland Drive, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 and to 
Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendants, 185 South 
State, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 in accordance with 
Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice on this / / day of September, 1987, 
-2- 0 1 9 ' : ; 00199 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIGHTLY, EUGENE E 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
CALDER, GLEN H 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910902670 CV 
DATE 11/19/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 




THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE HAVING HERETOFORE BEEN HEAARD BY 
THIS COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN 
TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW 
BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT CALDER WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE SURVEY OF 
THE PROPERTY WHICH RESULTED IN PLAINTIFF SELLING WRONG 
PROPERTY AND THAT PLAINNTIFF HAS SUSTAINED DAMAGES. 
2. PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED JUDGMENT PER PLAINTIFF'S 
SCHEDULE (EXHIBIT P-9) ITEMS A AND B. I.E. $29,383, 
INTEREST AND COSTS. 
CC: E.H. FANKHAUSER 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK 
00291 
i,-., hb J&.5-
E. H. FANKHADSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant/Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
it r n 
21 A3ofH,SZ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, * 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 








MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 




Duchesne County Clerk 
filing fee - Third Party Complaint 50.00 
00292 
Duchesne County Recorder 
Certificate of Survey 12.00 
District Court/Supreme Court 
filing fees - Appeal 
Duchesne County Clerk 
Certified copies 
District Court - filing fee 





A. Fernlund - serve Summons 
Wm. Mclff - serve Subpoena 
A. Fernlund - serve Subpoena 
Wasatch County Sheriff 
serve Subpoena 
Wasatch County Sheriff 






WITNESS FEE AND MILEAGE: 






4 8 . 5 0 
4 8 . 5 0 
1 7 . 0 0 
1 7 . 0 0 
1 5 . 0 0 
00293 
REPORTER FEES; 
Milo Harmon - Transcript 690.00 
ASO Professional Reporters 
Depo copy - Kreis 52.40 
MISCELLANEOUS COSTS: 
Alexander's Print Shop -
Printing of Briefs re Calder 
United Parcel Service - ship 
records 
Lt. Governor - Certificate of 
Incorporation 
Photocopies 120 at $.15 
TOTAL COSTS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 






The undersigned, being first sworn on oath states that he is 
the Attorney for Third Party Plaintiffs in the above entitled 
action; he is informed relative to the necessity for incurring the 
above listed costs and disbursements and states that the Memorandum 
is correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
E. ^ H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiffs 
00294 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
December, 1992. 
JL day of 
j£*. 
NOTARY J^ JfeLIC zr ^ T 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah La i: 
My Commission Expires: SV///V<^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendant, 254 West 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this /^ 
day of December, 1992. 
<?&t/Z?LU'tfc / _ - V. 
0029 5 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant/Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
By-
Third Judicial iUiSirict 
DEC 2 3 1992 
SACT LAKE COUNT/ 
>3pirty Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, * 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 












FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 910902670 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
The Complaint of the Third Party Plaintiffs against the Third 
Party Defendants, came on for a non-jury trial at a regular term of 
the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, June 23, 1992, the 
00296 
Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding. The Third Party Plaintiffs 
were present in person, except Peggy Barnett, and represented by 
their attorney, Ephraim H. Fankhauser. Third Party Defendant, Glen 
H. Calder was present in person and represented by his attorney, 
Robert F. Babcock. Witnesses were duly sworn and testified. Each 
of the parties presented evidence which was adduced and received by 
the Court. At the completion of the trial, the Court continued 
the matter pending presentation of closing arguments. The matter 
was then argued on October 28, 1992 and submitted to the Court for 
its decision. The Court, having taken the matter of its decision 
under advisement, having reviewed the pleadings and evidence 
presented, notified the respective parties of its ruling and 
decision by Minute Entry dated November 19, 1992. The Court, 
being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause, finds as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Third Party Plaintiffs, all related to one another, 
purchased by Uniform Real Estate Contract in June, 1971, a parcel 
of real property comprising 30 acres from Strawberry River Estates 
located in Duchesne County, Utah, described by metes and bounds 
(Exhibit P-3). 
2. The thirty (30) acre parcel originally purchased had a 
"T" configuration with approximately 20 acres situated west of Red 
Creek and approximately 10 acres East of Red Creek. 
2 
00297 
3. In the fall of 1971, Third Party Plaintiffs were contacted 
by representatives of Strawberry River Estates about the fact that 
the 30 acre MT" shaped property they purchased had left two 5 acre 
plots on each side of the 10 acre section East of Red Creek which 
could not be sold separately. 
4. Strawberry River Estates extended to Third Party 
Plaintiffs an option to even up the 10 acres East of Red Creek to 
a 20 acre parcel or trade the 30 acre parcel they had purchased for 
other acreage in a different location. Third Party Plaintiffs 
opted to take the two 5 acre parcels, increasing the total acreage 
to 40 acres, approximately 20 acres West and 20 acres East of Red 
Creek. 
5. Third Party Plaintiffs received a handwritten agreement 
that referenced the 40 acre plot as Lots 30 and 31 based upon an 
unrecorded plat that had been prepared for Strawberry River Estates 
by Edmund W. Allen. (Ex. P-4 and P-7). 
6. Third Party Plaintiffs received a new Uniform Real Estate 
Contract in October, 1991 which was back dated, describing the 40 
acre parcel by metes and bounds. (Ex. P-6) 
7. Although Third Party Plaintiffs had been shown the 
approximate location of the 40 acre parcel, they made inquiry of 
Strawberry River Estates about surveying the property. Third 
Party Plaintiffs did not know any other property owners who had had 
their property surveyed. Because of their concerns and 
reservations about the property description in the new Uniform Real 
3 
00298 
Estate Contract, they wanted to establish the location and 
boundaries of their property. 
8. Acting on information given by representatives of 
Strawberry River Estates, Third Party Plaintiffs (the Kightlys) 
contacted a surveyor at the Duchesne office of Third Party 
Defendant, Wilson Calder. Mr. Kightly asked that the subject 
property be surveyed to establish an exact location and boundaries, 
leaving a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) with 
the metes and bounds description of the 40 acre parcel. 
9. The Kightlys and Mr. Kreis went to the property and 
observed the survey crew placing re-bar stakes at the corners of 
the 40 acre parcel. They walked the property at that time, 
observing the location of the access road which was part of the 
original 30 acre plat and were shown where the corner stakes were 
placed by the survey crew of Third Party Defendant. 
10. A Certificate of Survey was received later dated May 15, 
1972 signed by Third Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, showing the 
location of the 40 acre parcel with approximately 20 acres West and 
20 acres East of Red Creek. (Ex. P-l) Mr. Calder certified that 
the plat on the Certificate of Survey, portrayed the survey that 
was made by him or under his direction, which representation based 
on the evidence was false and untrue. Mr. Calder testified he 
signed the Certificate of Survey as a favor to former students. 
That he never went to the site of the subject property at the time 
the survey was performed or before signing the Certificate. The 
4 
00299 
persons who did the survey were not licensed to do surveys in the 
State of Utah. They used the signature of Mr. Calder to get 
around the Utah License law. The persons who did the survey 
claimed they were in business with Mr. Calder and the Certificate 
of Survey (Ex. P-l) indicates that it was done by Wilson and 
Calder1s office in Duchesne, Utah. 
11. Third Party Plaintiffs occupied and used the subject 
property for a period of years. They planted trees and grass and 
repaired the fence along the county road. They placed wood fence 
posts on the South boundary West of Red Creek and metal fence posts 
on the South and North boundaries East of Red Creek, relying on the 
survey and the corner markers. 
12. Third Party Plaintiffs listed the property for sale with 
a realtor, Gerald Wilkerson, Farmer Bureau Agency. The property 
was sold to Klingers in July, 1983 for $32,000.00 (40 acres at 
$800.00 per acre). Klingers were taken to the subject property by 
the realtor on two or three occasions, utilizing the Certificate of 
Survey. Third Party Plaintiffs were present on one of these 
occasions and in reliance on the Certificate of Survey, Klingers 
were shown the location of the corner markers that had been placed 
by the survey crew. Klingers purchased the property and were 
given a Warranty Deed containing the legal description by metes and 
bounds confirmed by the Certificate of Survey. 
13. Some time in the early part of February, 1985, the 
Klingers contacted Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor, informing him that 
5 
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there was a problem with the boundaries. Third Party Plaintiffs, 
Rightly, were contacted and informed that there was a mistake with 
the survey. Based on the metes and bounds description, the West 
boundary of the property was actually a few feet West of Red Creek 
and was off approximately 1,000 feet. The buyers, Klingers, 
brought suit to rescind the purchase of the property. Third Party 
Plaintiffs were ordered to re-pay the Klingers and the subject 
property was reconveyed to sellers July 30, 1987. The recision 
and reconveyance occurred at a time when property values had 
substantially decreased from a high in 1983 to the time of recision 
and reconveyance. 
14. Third Party Plaintiff's as a direct result of the 
Klingers recision of the purchase and reconveyance of the property, 
suffered damages and loss in the amount of $29,383.00. 
15. Based on the evidence, the Court finds that Wilson Calder 
was not a corporation but a partnership at the time Mr. Calder 
signed the Certificate of Survey. 
16. The Court finds that the actual placing of the corner 
markers did not square with the legal description in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) given to the surveyor and shown in 
the Certificate of Survey. 
17. Third Party Plaintiffs relied upon the expertise and 
professional qualifications of Third Party Defendants at the time 
they requested their property to be surveyed. That they relied 




18. Third Party Defendant had a duty to survey and locate the 
subject property correctly which he failed to do. The damage and 
loss suffered by Third Party Plaintiffs was a direct result of the 
failure of Third Party Defendant to survey and correctly locate the 
boundaries of the subject property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Third Party Defendant, Calder, was negligent in the survey 
of the property, which resulted in Plaintiff selling the wrong 
property. 
2. Plaintiffs sustained damage and loss as a direct result of 
Third Party Defendant's negligence. 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment against the Third 
Party Defendant for damages and loss in the amount of $29,383.00, 
together with interest and cost. 








I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendants, 254 West 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, in accordance 
with Rule 4.504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, on this 




E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendant/Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
Third Judicus; iucact 
DEC 2 3 1992 
t£y J*«ferk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J- KLINGER, husband and wife, * 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 












Civil No. 910902670 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
The Complaint of the Third Party Plaintiffs came on for trial 
at a regular term of the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, 
June 23, 1992, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding. Third 
nr.304 
Party Plaintiffs were present and represented by their attorney, 
E. H. Fankhauser. Third Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, was 
present and represented by his attorney, Robert F. Babcock. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified and evidence was presented and 
adduced by the Court. The matter was argued to the Court on 
October 28, 1992 and submitted for determination and decision. The 
Court, having taken the matter under advisement, having reviewed 
the pleadings and evidence presented, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, now, therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Third Party 
Plaintiffs be and are hereby awarded judgment against the Third 
Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, for the amount of $29,383.00, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from 
July 30, 1987, the date of reconveyance of the subject property to 
Third Party Plaintiffs, in the amount of $15,915.80, together with 
costs in the amount of $ 1,279.72. That this judgment is to bear 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry until 
paid in full. 
DATED this day of December, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: , 




I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendants, 254 West 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, in accordance 
with Rule 4.504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, on this 
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Robert F. Babcock #0158 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant Calder 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 531-7000 
DEC 3! 8 us AM *92 
^'£?*2»'' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and dba 
WILSON CALDER, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT CALDERfS 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT/THIRD 
PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM 
OF COSTS 
Civil No. 910902670CV 
Judge Sawaya 
Third-Party Defendant Glen Calder, by and through counsel, 
objects to the proposed Findings of Fact, the proposed form of the 
Judgment, and the Memorandum of Costs submitted by Defendant/Third 
Party Plaintiffs subsequent to the entry of this Court's Minute 
Entry. 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A new finding of fact, between #1 and #2, should be 
entered stating as follows: 
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Prior to purchasing any property, Third Party Plaintiffs were 
shown the property by representatives of Strawberry Estates 
using a plat prepared by Edmund Allen that referenced parcels 
by lot numbers including lots 30 and 31. 
2. Proposed #6 should be corrected to read as follows: 
Third Party Plaintiffs received a new Uniform Real Estate 
Contract from Strawberry Estates in October, 1971, which was 
back dated to June, 1971, describing a 40 acre parcel by meets 
and bounds that was represented bv Strawberry Estates to be 
the same as lots 30 and 31 from the Edmund Allen map. 
3. Between #6 and #7 a new finding should be included that 
states as follows: 
In reality, the meets and bounds description in the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract was off by 1000 feet from what was 
described by lots 30 and 31 in the Edmund Allen map. Further, 
the meets and bounds description in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was off by 1000 feet from what Third Party Plaintiffs 
believed they were purchasing from Strawberry Estates. 
4. Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #7 on the basis 
that it is not supported by the evidence at the trial and is not 
found in the court's minute entry. 
5. Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #8 on the basis 
that it is not supported by the evidence at the trial and is not 
found in the court's minute entry. 
6. Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #10 on the 
basis that it is not supported by the evidence at the trial and is 
-2-
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not found in the court's minute entry, Third-Party Defendant did 
not sign the certificate "as a favor to former students." The 
persons who did the survey were qualified to do surveys. It is 
unsupported by the evidence to state: "They used the signature of 
Mr. Calder to get around the Utah License law." 
7. Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #14 on the 
basis it does not itemize the damages as found by the court. 
8. Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #15 on the 
basis that it is not supported by the evidence, is outside the 
scope of the Complaint and is outside the issues that were 
litigated; i.e., the corporate status of Wilson-Calder was never 
litigated, the "alleged" partnership was never served or even 
claimed to have been served, never filed a responsive pleading in 
the case, nor made any kind of appearance in the case. 
9. Third-Party Defendant objects to Proposed #16 insofar as 
it states that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was "given to the 
surveyor." 
OBJECTIONS TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Third-Party Defendant objects to the following costs of the 
Memorandum of Costs: 
1. The "cost" of the Certificate of Survey. 
2. The filing fees of the appeal as well as the costs of the 
transcript plus the copying of the appellate briefs from the first 
trial were not granted by the appellate court and should not be 
granted now. 
3. Certified copies of something from Duchesne County Clerk. 
-3-
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4. Service of subpoenas to witness in the first trial that 
did not involve Third-Party Defendant or in subpoenaing experts for 
Third-Party Plaintiff. 
5. Witness fees and mileage for witnesses in the first trial 
that did not involve Third-Party Defendant or in subpoenaing 
experts for Third-Party Plaintiff. 
6. The cost of the copy of the deposition of one of the 
Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
7. The miscellaneous costs not mentioned above are not 
properly taxable. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT 
Third-Party Defendant objects to the form of the judgment as 
it establishes the date for interest to run from July 30, 1987, 
which was not found by the court, rather from the date of the entry 
of the judgment. In addition, Third-Party Defendant objects to the 
costs included on the basis of the objections specifically noted 
above. 
DATED this IT day of December, 1992. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: ti^rf&XlA 
Robert F. Babcock 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT/THIRD-
PARTY PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF COSTS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
E.H. Fankhauser^ 243 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 




Robert F. Babcock #0158 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Third-Party-
Defendant Calder 
254 West 400 South, #200 









IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• ~j?&' 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and dba 
WILSON CALDER, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Civil No. 910902670CV 
Judge Sawaya 
Third-Party Defendant Glen H. Calder, by and through his 
counsel of record, Robert F. Babcock, of and for the law firm of 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, hereby requests the Court for a hearing on its 
Objections to Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Memorandum of Costs 
submitted concurrently herewith. 
DATED this cA day of December, 1992. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
By: 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Robert F. Babcock 
00311 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
E.H. Fankhauser* 243 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this 2frk day of December, 1992. 
10-37-calder.req 
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E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendants/Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, * 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and 
d/b/a WILSON CALDER, 






REPLY TO THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS• 
OBJECTION TO THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFFS1 FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, JUDGMENT 
AND MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Civil No. 910902670 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
Third Party Plaintiffs1 by and through their attorney of 
record, E. H. Fankhauser, hereby reply to the Objection of Third 
Party Defendant, Calder, to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
nn^n 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Memorandum of Costs in the order 
in which they appear, as follows: 
1. The request of Third Party Defendant to insert a new 
finding in the proposed Findings of Facts does not constitute an 
objection to an existing Finding of Fact and therefore should be 
denied and rejected. In the alternative, Third Party Plaintiffs 
do not object to the Court adding an additional Finding after 
paragraph 3 stating as follows: 
After purchasing property, Third Party Plaintiffs were shown 
a Plat by representatives of Strawberry River Estates proposed 
to have been prepared by Edmund Allen that referenced parcels 
by lot numbers including lots 30 and 31. 
2. The objection of Third Party Defendant to proposed Finding 
#6 is a mis-statement of the facts and evidence presented to the 
Court. The wording suggested by Third Party Defendant is 
objectionable to Plaintiff after the words metes and bounds. Third 
Party Plaintiffs would not object to additional wording, provided 
it reads as follows: By metes and bounds, which description 
purported to be the same as Lots 30 and 31 from the Plat. The 
evidence presented at the time of trial is inconclusive as to 
whether or not the Plat shown to Third Party Plaintiffs was in fact 
the Edmund Allen Plat or a copy of some other Plat prepared by 
representatives of Strawberry River Estates. Further, the 
description in the Uniform Real Estate Contract purported to be the 
same as the description for Lots 30 and 31 to comprise the 40 acre 
parcel as opposed to the 30 acre parcel originally purchased. 
2 
3. Paragraph 3 of the Objection to Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law of Third Party Defendant is not in reality an 
objection but a request that new findings be added to the purposed 
Findings and therefore should be denied. Should the Court 
determine that the Third Party Defendant be entitled to additional 
findings, Third Party Plaintiffs would request that the wording of 
a new finding between 6 and 7 state as follows: 
Unknown to Third Party Plaintiffs, the metes and bounds 
description in the revised Uniform Real Estate Contract was 
off by 1000 feet as determined by the survey of Mr. 
Christensen. That this error should have been discovered by 
Third Party Defendant, Calder, at the time the survey 
requested to be performed was performed, which the Third Party 
Defendant failed to do. 
4. Third Party Defendants objection to proposed Finding #7 
is without merit and therefore disputed on the basis that the 
testimony of both Gene Rightly and Harry Kreis was uncontradicted 
with regard to the reason for wanting a survey. The objection 
should be denied. 
5. Third Party Defendants objection to Finding #8 on the 
basis it is not supported by evidence is disputed and denied in 
that the testimony of Gene Kightly and the evidence submitted was 
basically uncontradicted. Third Party Defendant's objection 
should be denied. 
6. Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 10 of the 
Findings, based on a claim it is not supported by evidence is 
disputed and denied. The witnesses produced by Third Party 
3 
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Defendant, including the testimony of Third Party Defendant, 
supported the Finding that the persons who performed the actual 
survey were not licensed to do surveys in the State of Utah. 
7. Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 14 of the 
Findings is without merit in that it is not necessary to itemize 
damages found by the Court as long as the total amount of the 
damages stated in the Findings is equal to and in harmony with that 
of the Court. This objection should be denied. 
8. Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 15 of the 
Findings on a claim that it is not supported by evidence is 
disputed and denied. The evidence presented at trial was 
uncontradicted and confirmed by Mr. Calder and his attorney to the 
effect that Wilson-Calder was a partnership, was not a corporation 
at the time of the alleged survey and was only in the process of 
incorporating. This objection should be denied. 
9. Third Party Defendant's objection to paragraph 16 of the 
Findings is without merit or substance. The evidence and 
testimony of Gene Kightly was uncontradicted. Mr. Kightly 
testified that he gave to the surveyor a copy of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with the metes and bounds description. 
In that a majority of the objections to the Findings of Facts 
submitted by Third Party Plaintiffs to the Court are without 
substance and merit, the Court should deny Third Party Defendant's 
objections except as agreed to by Third Party Plaintiffs, and award 
to Third Party Plaintiffs the costs and attorney's fees necessarily 
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incurred in responding to Third Party Defendants objections. 
The Third Party Defendants Objections are without merit or 
substance and should be denied. The Objections on the part of 
Third Party Defendant to the Findings of Fact and the form of 
Judgment take on the appearance of an attempt to hinder and delay 
the speedy process of processing the judgment to collection. This 
would constitute a violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, entitling the Court to impose sanctions against the 
Third Party Defendant and his counsel by assessing as costs 
attorney's fees incurred by Third Party Plaintiffs in connection 
with these Objections. Third Party Plaintiffs request the Court 
impose sanctions and award to them their attorney's fees incurred 
in connection herewith. 
DATED this ^ S day of January, 1993. 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiffs 
00317 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Robert F. Babcock, Attorney for Third Party Defendant, 254 West 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this J*^ 
day of January, 1993. 
H0318 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIGHTLY, EUGENE E 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
CALDER, GLEN H 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910902670 CV 
DATE 01/29/93 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 




THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT CALDER'S REQUEST FOR HEARING HAVING 
BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501. COMES NOW 
THE COURT AND STATES AS FOLLOWS: FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT REFLECT 
THE COURTS DECISION. OBJECTIONS ARE DENIED - NO HEARING 
GRANTED. 
CC: E. H. FANKHAUSER 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK 
00310 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Bar No. 1032 
Attorney for Defendants/Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
R1EC 9STSKCT fiAltUT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB h 1993 
SALT LAKE C. s^ ec^...:-:v 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL 
J. KLINGER, husband and wife, * 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and 
d/b/a WILSON CALDER, 







ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS TO 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910902670 CV 
Judge Sawaya 
Third Party Defendant's Objection to Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pursuant to provisions of Rule 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having been submitted to the Court 
0D3?O 
pursuant to Rule 4.501(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration; 
and Notice to Submit for Decision having been filed with the Court; 
and the Court, after considering the Objections of Third Party 
Defendant, request for hearing, the Reply of Third Party 
Plaintiffs, and being fully advised in the premises and having 
submitted a Minute Entry decision pursuant to Rule 4.501, Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Findings and 
Judgment submitted by Third Party Plaintiffs, reflects the Court's 
decision. Third Party Defendant's Objection to the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and request for hearing are 
denied. 
DATED this * / day of February, 1993. 
BY THE ^ OUfeT 
JAJE&S S . SAWAYA 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Robert F. Babcock,Attorney for Third Party Defendant, 254 West 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this 3~^~ 





I Robert F. Babcock #0158 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
x Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
> 254 West 400 South, #200 
^ Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
v
 (801) 531-7000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. KLINGER and 
KAROL J. KLINGER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L. 
KIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS, 




GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN DOE 
WILSON, individually and dba 
WILSON CALDER, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Trial Court No. 910902670CV 
Judge Sawaya 
Notice is hereby given that Third-Party Defendant and 
Appellant Glen H. Calder appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
final Order executed by the Honorable James Sawaya on February 4, 
1993, regarding the above-referenced matter, which denied a hearing 
on Third-Party Defendant's Objection to Third-Party Plaintiffs' 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment which was 
entered against said Third-Party Defendant on December 23, 1992. 
Appellant Glen H. Calder also appeals from the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment. 
00326 
DATED this 7 day of March, 1993. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Robert F. Babcock 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed, postage prepaid, to E.H. 
Fankhauser at_JL43 East 400 South, #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this £7^day of March, 1993. 
10-38-calder.not 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT B. CLINGER 










3rd-Party Pits. ) 
vs. 
CALDER, et al. ) 
^rd-Party Defts. ) 
Transcript of: 
Closing Arguments 
Case No. 910902670 
The above-entitled cause of action came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State 
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Wednesday, October 
28, 1992. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
E.H. FANKHAUSER, ESQ. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ROBERT F. BABCOCK, ESQ, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1 that was the problem there. Had they followed the 
2 description, found the reference, as Mr. Christensen did, 
3 we wouldn't have been in this lawsuit. 
4 Now we have alleged damages. There is no 
5 question that the property was sold by my people to the 
6 dingers at $800 per acre, and that was 40 acres, for 
7 $32,000. Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor who sold the 
8 property was very familiar with the area, is still 
9 familiar with the area, and is in real estate, testified 
10 that he felt the present market value of the land is 
11 around $8,000. My people lost the value of their 
12 bargain, the 32,000 which they sold the property for, 
13 less the 8,000, which the value is now 24,000. 
14 In addition to that, they incurred costs when 
15 they sold the property. They had to pay title insurance 
16 of $163, and this is on our Exhibit 9-P. They paid a 
17 real estate commission of $3200, and they paid document 
18 recording fees of $20, for a total of $3,383. They 
19 incurred costs with Mr. Christensen to re-survey the 
20 property, the first time $200. He had to go back out and 
21 do it a second time because someone had removed or picked 
22 out some of the stakes that Mr. Christensen put in, for a 
23 total of $300. This comes to damages of $27,683 
24 ($27,883), to which interest should be added at the 
25 statutory rate of 10 percent. 
10 
Now, we are asking in addition to that, 
consequential damages which flow directly from this 
negligence, which was the cost of the lawsuit with the 
dingers and the cost to go to the Supreme Court, which 
we show at $5,630.30. In addition, we have had to pay 
$12,000 cash to settle the suit with the dingers, 
bringing our totals to approximately $45,313.30 
($45,513.30). 
The last item which we addressed at the close 
of evidence, I move to amend the pleadings to include 
Wilson & Calder as a partnership and include the 
partnership under its name. I did that under Rule 15. 
All of the evidence was to the effect that Mr. Calder and 
Mr. Wilson were in a partnership, not a corporation at 
the time this occurred. The fact that their certificate 
shows it is Wilson & Calder would indicate a partnership, 
and under Rule 15 the Court has discretion to grant that 
amendment where there is no prejudice here. And Mr. 
Calder was here, he had all of his people here, he 
defended this action, and let us amend to sue under the 
partnership name. 
THE COURT: Didn't you do that? Didn't you sue 
them as a partnership? 
MR. FANKHAUSER: I thought I sued him as 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE COPY AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTATCHED BRIEF, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID TO THE 
FOLLOWING: 
EPHRAM H. FRANKHAUSER 
243 EAST 400 SOUTH, #200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
DATED THIS DAY OF AUGUST, 1993 
